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DOUBLE TAXATION OF PARTNERSHIP
INCOME IN ILLINOIS
Continental Illinois National Bank & Trust Co. v. Zagel
78 Ill. 2d 387, 401 N.E.2d 491 (1979)
A state's power to tax is inherently broad,' subject only to state
and federal constitutional restraints.2 One of the lesser known state
constitutional limitations on a state's taxing power consists of the unfa-
vorable treatment generally accorded to "double taxation."' 3 Essen-
tially, double taxation results where a second tax is imposed on
something that is already subject to tax.4 In a few states, double taxa-
tion is expressly prohibited.5 In most states, double taxation is judi-
cially disfavored, unless its imposition is accompanied by a clear
legislative intent.6 Upon finding double taxation, courts will generally
I. International Harvester Co. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Taxation, 322 U.S. 435, 444-45 (1944)
("The power to tax 'is an incident of sovereignty, and is coextensive with that to which it is an
incident. All subjects over which the sovereign powers of a state extends, are objects of taxa-
tion ... '). See also Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522 (1959); Shaffer v.
Carter, 252 U.S. 37 (1920). See generally E. STIMSON, JURISDICTION & POWER OF TAXATION
(1933); 2 T. COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 986-1107 (8th ed. 1927).
2. Eg., Providence Bank v. Billings, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 514 (1830).
Challenges to state taxes under the federal constitution are generally made under the equal
protection clause and the privileges and immunities clause. A state tax will be found unconstitu-
tional under the equal protection clause only if it is based on a classification that is arbitrary and
capricious. So long as the tax's classification is found to have a rational basis, it will not be found
violative of the equal protection clause. See, e.g., Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U.S.
522 (1959). See also Sholley, Equal Protection in Tax Legislation, 24 VA. L. REV. 229 (1938). A
state tax will be found unconstitutional under the privileges and immunities clause if it discrimi-
nates against citizens of another state. See, e.g., Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948). See also
Lomen, Privileges and Immunities under the Fourteenth Amendment, 18 WASH. L. REV. 120, 129-34
(1943).
A state's power to tax is also subject to such restraints as may be imposed by its own constitu-
tion. E.g., Lane County v. Oregon, 74 U.S. (7 Wall) 71 (1868). Such limitations vary among the
states. See generally Morrow, State Constitutional Limitations on the Taxing Authority of State
Legislatures, 9 NAT. TAX J. 126 (1956).
3. The United States Constitution does not prohibit double taxation by a state. E.g., Baker
v. Druesedow, 263 U.S. 137 (1923). To be found in violation of the federal constitution, a state's
imposition of double taxation must be shown to be arbitrary and capricious under the equal pro-
tection clause. Id at 142. See note 2 supra.
4. Double taxation actually consists of the concurrence of four elements. Two taxes must be
imposed 1) by the same unit of state government, 2) for the same purpose, 3) over the same time
period and 4) the objects of the two taxes--the persons, property, or privileges taxed-must par-
tially overlap. Eg., Federated Mutual Implement Hardware Ins. Co. v. Commissioner, 266 F.2d
66 (8th Cir. 1959); T. COOLEY, THE LAW OF TAXATION § 223 (4th ed. 1924) [hereinafter cited as
COOLEY]. The elements of double taxation are further discussed in the text accompanying notes
62-93 infra.
5. Eg., IDAHO CONST. art. 7, § 5. See note 93 infra for a compilation of authorities.
6. See, e.g., Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 346 Mass. 667, 195 N.E.2d 332 (1964).
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construe one of the two taxes involved in such a manner as to eliminate
the double imposition of tax.
7
Prior to 1979, Illinois followed the vast majority of states and the
federal government in treating a partnership8 as a "conduit" for pur-
poses of the state's general income tax.9 Under this approach, partner-
ship income is deemed to flow through the partnership to the
individual partners. '0 No income tax is levied on the partnership itself;
instead, each partner's share of partnership income is treated as his
own income, which is then subject to tax."I In 1979, the Illinois legisla-
ture enacted an additional income tax on partnerships themselves.
12
Because the legislature left intact the conduit provision of the state's
general income tax, partnership income became subject to two income
taxes: the new tax at the partnership level and the general income tax
at the individual partner level.
Relying on an express state constitutional ban against double taxa-
tion of an individual's income, ' 3 a local partnership challenged the new
tax14 in Continental Illinois National Bank & Trust Co. v. Zagel. ' 5 The
Illinois Supreme Court rejected the claim that the partnership income
tax resulted in double taxation of the individual partners' income. As
the sole ground for its decision, the court distinguished a partnership
See note 62 infra for other state authorities. See also Tennessee v. Whitworth, 117 U.S. 129, 137
(1886). See generally COOLEY, supra note 4, §§ 223, 224.
7. See, e.g., Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 346 Mass. 667, 195 N.E.2d 332 (1964).
8. For income tax purposes, a" 'partnership' includes a syndicate, group, pool, joint venture
or other unincorporated organization through or by means of which any business, financial opera-
tion or venture is carried on .. " ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 15-1501(a)(16) (1979). See also
I.R.C. §§ 761(a), 7701(a)(2). The Uniform Partnership Act, § 6(1) similarly defines a partnership
as an association of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners a business for profit. ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 106 , § 6(I) (1979). The existence of a partnership fundamentally depends on the par-
ties' intent. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733 (1949); Peck v. Peck, 16 Ill. 2d
268, 157 N.E.2d 249 (1959). See also 6 J. MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 35.03
(1975 rev. ed.).
9. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 2-205(b) (1977) (amended 1979); I.R.C. § 701. See note 113
infra for a compilation of similar state statutes.
10. See, e.g., United States v. Bayse, 410 U.S. 441 (1973). See generally A. ARONSOHN,
PARTNERSHIPS AND INCOME TAXES (PLI 1966).
11. E.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 2-205(b) (1977) (amended 1979).
12. Personal Property Tax Replacement Income Tax Act, P.A. 8 1-1st Sp. Sess.-I, § 2(c), 1979
Ill. Laws 4925 (1979). The partnership income tax was one of four taxes enacted to replace the
state's personal property tax. For details of the other three taxes enacted, see note 146 infra. For
details of the circumstances surrounding the replacement of the state's personal property tax, see
text accompanying notes 140-43 infra.
13. ILL. CONST. art. IX, § 3(a). See note 141 infra for the text of this provision.
14. The validity of the other taxes enacted to replace the state's personal property tax was
also challenged in what became a consolidated action. See note 146 infra. The issues raised with
respect to these other taxes are not discussed in this case comment.
15. 78 Ill. 2d 387, 401 N.E.2d 491 (1979).
NOTES AND COMMENTS
from its partners.' 6 By viewing the partnership income tax as falling on
the income of a separate legal entity as distinguished from the general
income tax which falls on the income of the individual partners, the
court precluded a finding of double taxation. The dissent argued that
the income of a partnership was also the income of the individual part-
ners so that the new tax, together with the general income tax, resulted
in double taxation.
17
This case comment will examine the Zagel court's treatment of the
double taxation issue. The law of double taxation will be presented
and applied to Illinois' partnership and general income taxes to analyze
and expand upon the court's finding that no double taxation resulted.
The analysis will confirm that the key factor in determining the double
taxation issue is whether the income of a partnership is to be deemed
the partnership's or the individual partners'. After reviewing the
court's basis for its decision that partnership income should be deemed
the partnership's and finding it lacking in substantive merit, the case
comment will conclude that the rationale underlying the widely ac-
cepted conduit approach represents the better view. If the partnership
income tax is then viewed as a second tax on the income of the individ-
ual partners, double taxation results. Surprisingly, the new tax came
within an exception to the state's constitutional ban against double in-
come taxation 18 so that a finding of double taxation would not have
precluded the court from upholding the new tax. However, this excep-
tion was overlooked in the decision.
CLASSIFICATION OF TAXES
Double taxation involves an overlap in the things that are subject
to two particular taxes.19 The "thing" subject to a given tax is termed
the tax's "object" and it is generally classified in terms of persons, prop-
erty or privileges.20 When the issue of double taxation arises, it is first
necessary to establish the objects of the two taxes in question.2 1 Once
the objects of the two taxes are established, it can then be determined if
16. Id at 407, 401 N.E.2d at 501.
17. Id at 415-16, 401 N.E.2d at 505-06 (Clark, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
18. ILL. CONST. art. IX, § 5(c). The text of this section appears in note 142 infra.
19. An overlap between the objects of the two taxes at issue is but one of the four elements of
double taxation. For an explanation and discussion of the four elements, see text accompanying
notes 62-93 infra.
20. See J. HELLERSTEIN & W. HELLERSTEIN, STATE & LOCAL TAXATION 27 (4th ed. 1978)
[hereinafter cited as HELLERSTEIN]; Peairs, General Principles of Taxation: An Initial Survey, 6
TAX L. REV. 267, 292 (1951); COOLEY, supra note 4, § 38.
21. See, e.g., Educational Films Corp. v. Ward, 282 U.S. 379 (1931); Dawson v. Kentucky
Dist. & Whse. Co., 255 U.S. 288 (1921).
139
CHICAGO KENT LAW REVIEW
an overlap between them exists. Establishing the object of a tax is
largely a matter of statutory interpretation in light of the general char-




Taxes on persons are termed capitation or poll taxes. These taxes
are levies of a fixed amount imposed on all persons, or a selected group
of persons, within the taxing jurisdiction. 23 These taxes are levied with-
out regard to a person's property, income or other circumstances.24 A
state tax of $1.00 per year on all inhabitants between the ages of
twenty-one and sixty is typical of such taxes. 25 Poll taxes were popular




Taxes on real and personal property are commonly termed prop-
erty taxes. These taxes are imposed on property itself27 within the tax-
ing jurisdiction and are generally measured by a specified percentage of
the property's value.28 The taxes are typically imposed once a year.
29
Perhaps the most familiar type of property tax is a tax on real estate.
30
Some property taxes are measured by a percentage of the income
derived from the property subject to tax. This method of measuring
property taxes is generally used where the value of the property would
be otherwise difficult to determine. Although the tax is measured on
the basis of the income derived from the property, the object of the tax
is nevertheless considered to be the income-producing property itself.
3'
In Redfield v. Fisher,3 2 the Oregon Supreme Court found that a tax
22. Id
23. See Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277 (1937). See also COOLEY, supra note 4, § 40.
24. 302 U.S. at 281.
25. Id at 282.
26. See SEGILMAN, ESSAYS IN TAXATION 16-17 (10th ed. 1931).
27. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 499 (1979). See also New York ex rel. Cohn v.
Graves, 300 U.S. 308, 314 (1937); Dawson v. Kentucky Dist. & Whse. Co., 255 U.S. 288, 293-94
(1921); COOLEY, supra note 4, § 39.
28. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, §§ 501, 502 (1979); see also Cooley, supra note 4, § 39.
29. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 508(a) (1979).
30. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, §§ 482-811 (1979).
31. See, e.g., Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Minnesota, 278 U.S. 503 (1929) (a tax on the in-state
trackage of railroads measured by a percentage of a railroad's income is a property tax). See also
Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U.S. 37 (1920) (a tax on oil and gas production measured by a percentage of
income derived is a tax in lieu of a property tax). See general, COOLEY, supra note 4, § 46.
32. 135 Or. 180, 292 P. 813 (1930), cert. denied, 284 U.S. 617 (1931).
NOTES AND COMMENTS
measured by 5% of the income derived from stocks, bonds and other
intangible personal property had as its object the intangible personal
property itself.
Taxes on Privileges
Privileges represent the residual category for objects of taxation.3 3
The category includes all those acts, transactions or privileges that are
subject to tax.34 These acts, transactions or privileges are typically nu-
merous and varied. 35 A privilege tax generally accrues only upon the
exercise of the specified privilege or the occurrence of the specified
act.36 Thus, an income tax accrues upon the earning of income 37 and a
33. Commentators are not in perfect agreement on the terminology of this category of objects
of taxes. Some term this category "excise taxes" while others differentiate between income taxes
and excise taxes. Compare HELLERSTEIN, supra note 20, at 29 with COOLEY, supra note 4, § 38.
34. See Peairs, General Principles of Taxation.- An Initial Survey, 6 TAX. L. REV. 267, 292
(1951); COOLEY, supra note 4, §§ 42-47.
35. In Illinois, the following acts, transactions or privileges are subject to tax: privilege of
earning income, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, §§ 1-101 to 17-1701 (1979); transfer of property at death,
id §§ 375-404; privilege of operating motor vehicles on state highways, id §§ 417-434; privilege of
using tangible personal property in the state purchased at retail from a retailer, id §§ 439.1-.22;
privilege of carrying on a retail business, id. §§ 440-453; privilege of engaging in a cigarette sales
business at retail and wholesale, id §§ 453.1-.30; privilege of using cigarettes, id §§ 453.31-.67;
privilege of carrying on a message transmission business, id §§ 467.1-. 15; privilege of carrying on
a gas distribution business, id §§ 467.16-.30; privilege of carrying on an electricity generation and
distribution business, id §§ 468-48 1a; privilege of operating coin-operated amusement devices, id
§§ 481b. 1-. 16; privilege of carrying on a hotel business, id §§ 481 b.31-.40; privilege of transferring
title to real estate, id §§ 1001-1008; privilege of conducting bingo games, id §§ 1101-1107.
See generally COOLEY, supra note 4, §§ 45, 1670-1718.
36. See HELLERSTEIN, supra note 20, at 29; COOLEY, supra note 4, § 45.
37. See, e.g., New York ex rel. Cohn v. Graves, 300 U.S. 308, 314 (1937).
At one time, there was a split among state courts concerning the object of an income tax. The
seminal case for the view that the object of an income tax is property was Pollock v. Farmers'
Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895). In Pollock, the United States Supreme Court interpreted
a federal income tax that included income from property as a tax on property itself. The Court
held that this property tax violated the requirement in article I, section 2 of the United States
Constitution that federal taxes be equally apportioned among the states on the basis of population.
Id at 442. The Pollock decision prompted the passage of the sixteenth amendment authorizing
the imposition of a non-apportioned federal income tax in 1913.
When states began enacting income taxes during the first half of this century, their constitu-
tionality was challenged. Interpreting these taxes as property taxes provided courts with a vehicle
for bringing income taxes within state constitutional taxing frameworks that were largely property
tax oriented. A few state supreme courts took this approach. See, e.g., In re Opinion of the
Justices, 220 Mass. 613, 108 N.E. 570 (1915). The majority of state supreme courts viewed income
taxes as privilege or excise taxes. See, e.g., Ludlow-Saylor Wire Co. v. Wollbrinck, 275 Mo. 339,
205 S.W. 196 (1918). The cases are collected in Annot., II A.L.R. 313 (1921); Annot., 70 A.L.R.
468 (1931); Annot., 71 A.L.R. 1226 (1931); Annot., 97 A.L.R. 1488 (1935).
In New York ex ret Cohn v. Graves, 300 U.S. 308 (1937), the United States Supreme Court
abandoned its view of an income tax as a tax on property and adopted the view that it is a privi-
lege tax. Id at 314-15. This is now the established view. See W. NEWHOUSE, CONSTITUTIONAL
UNIFORMITY AND EQUALITY IN STATE TAXATION 743-60 (1959) [hereinafter referred to as NEW-
HOUSE].
For a comprehensive discussion of this controversy, see NEWHOUSE, supra, at 690-766.
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business occupation tax accrues when one engages in the occupation
subject to tax.
38
Income taxes are generally measured by a percentage of net in-
come, i e., total income received less related expenses and other adjust-
ments. 39 In contrast, business occupation taxes are generally measured
as a percentage of the total or gross income obtained from the taxed
occupation, without any adjustments. 4° Other privilege taxes are gen-
erally also measured as a percentage of the gross amount of money
transferred in the taxed transaction.
4'
In establishing the object of a particular tax, courts look beyond
the relevant statutory language and consider the tax's operation and
effect.42 In Dawson v. Kentucky Distilleries and Warehouse Co. 43 the
United States Supreme Court examined a fifty-cent per gallon tax on
whiskey withdrawn from bond or transferred to another state. The tax
was described statutorily as an occupation tax: it was ostensibly im-
posed on the privilege of engaging in the business of manufacturing or
storing whiskey. 4 The Court rejected the statute's characterization of
the tax, noting that the tax did not accrue during the manufacture or
storage of the whiskey but only upon its removal from bond or transfer
to another state. 45 Finding the object of the tax to be the whiskey itself,
the Court concluded that the tax was actually a property tax. 6 By con-
ducting this type of operative analysis of a tax's statutory language, the
true objects of the two taxes alleged to result in double taxation can be
established and the determination made whether double taxation has
occurred.
38. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, §§ 440-453 (1979) (Retailers' Occupation Tax); Central
Television Service, Inc. v. Isaacs, 27 Ill. 2d 420, 189 N.E.2d 333 (1963) (Retailers' Occupation Tax
is not a tax on the privilege of buying or upon the individual sale, but is a tax on the occupation of
selling at retail). For a compilation of other business occupations that are taxed in Illinois, see
note 35 supra.
39. E.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, §§ 2-201(b), 202-204 (1979). See also COOLEY, supra note
4, § 49. See generally STATE TAX HANDBOOK (CCH Oct. i, 1980).
40. E.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, §§ 440-453 (1979) (Retailers' Occupation Tax). See gener-
ally STATE TAX HANDBOOK (CCH Oct. 1, 1980).
41. Eg., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, §§ 417-434 (1979) (tax on the privilege of operating motor
vehicles on public highways measured by a percentage of the purchase price of gasoline). See
generally STATE TAX HANDBOOK (CCH Oct. i, 1980).
42. E.g., Educational Films Corp. v. Ward, 282 U.S. 375, 387 (1931); Marshall v. South Car-
olina Tax Comm'n, 178 S.C. 57, 182 S.E. 96 (1935).
43. 255 U.S. 288 (1921).
44. Id at 289.
45. Id at 293.
46. Id at 294.
142
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DOUBLE TAXATION: ORIGINS AND DEFINITION
The unfavorable treatment accorded to double taxation springs
from an intuitive feeling that something which is already subject to one
tax should not be subject to additional taxes.47 At law, this feeling is
reflected in the notion that taxes should be equitably imposed. As
noted by the United States Supreme Court:
Justice requires that the burdens of government shall as far as is
practicable be laid equally on all, and, if property is taxed once in
one way, it would ordinarily be wrong to tax it again in another way,
when the burden of both taxes falls on the same person.
48
This notion of an equitable distribution of the tax burden has been
incorporated into most state constitutions in what have been termed
"uniformity" clauses.49 These clauses generally require that all objects
of a given class or type must be uniformly or equally taxed.50
The primary effect of these uniformity clauses has been to insure
an equal tax burden distribution with respect to any one particular
tax.-' Under these clauses, if a tax is imposed on a given class or type
of object, all such objects must be subject to the same tax. 52 If some
objects of a class or type are taxed while others of the same type or class
are not, or if the objects of the same class or type are taxed differently,
the tax is found to be nonuniformly applied and is invalidated. 53 In
Flynn v. Kucharski,54 a county property tax was being collected in such
a manner that, in some parts of the county, a small percentage of the
tax funds was retained by units of local government and not paid into
the county treasury. The Illinois Supreme Court found that the effect
of this practice was that people paid less county tax in some areas of the
47. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 437 U.S. 443, 457 (1978) (the Court referring to
the policy of avoiding the imposition of custom duties on the same goods by both the exporting
and importing countries as based on the "intuitively appealing principle regarding double taxa-
tion").
48. Tennessee v. Whitworth, 117 U.S. 129, 137 (1886). Accord, Schreiber v. Cook County,
388 I11. 297, 58 N.E.2d 40 (1944).
49. NEWHOUSE, supra note 37, at 3.
50. Eg., ILL. CONST. art. IX, § 4(a) (real property must be uniformly taxed). See HELLER-
STEIN, supra note 20, at 43-44; NEWHOUSE, supra note 37, at 9-11. See generally Matthews, The
Function of Constitutional Provisions Requiring Uniformity in Taxation, 38 Ky. L.J. 31, 181, 377,
503 (1949-50).
51. Matthews, The Function of Constitutional Provisions Requiring Uniformity in Taxation, 38
Ky. L.J. 31, 51-54 (1949-50).
52. Id
53. See, e.g., Idaho Telephone Co. v. Baird, 91 Idaho 425, 423 P.2d 337 (1967) (property of
utilities taxed differently from other property); In re Assessment of Kanawha Valley Bank, 144 W.
Va. 346, 109 S.E.2d 649 (1959) (banks' capital stock taxed differently from other personal prop-
erty).
54. 45 I. 2d 211, 258 N.E.2d 329 (1970).
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county than in others, thus violating the uniformity clause of the Illi-
nois Constitution.
A secondary effect of uniformity clauses has resulted from their
application to situations where an inequitable tax burden distribution
results not from one but from two taxes. This extended application of
the requirement for a uniform tax burden evolved into the doctrine of
double taxation.
5
The doctrine of double taxation developed at a time when prop-
erty taxes were the predominant form of state taxation.5 6 The imposi-
tion of a second property tax on some but not all the property already
taxed in a taxing jurisdiction was readily recognized by the courts as an
unequal distribution of the tax burden and was, therefore, disallowed.
5 7
For example, in Campbell County v. Newport58 the Kentucky Court of
Appeals considered two real property taxes, one county-wide and the
other limited to real property in cities and towns within the county.
The court noted that a relatively greater tax burden was placed on
property located in cities and towns than on other property in the
county.5 9 Citing the uniformity clause of the Kentucky Constitution,
the court found that this unequal distribution of the tax burden
amounted to double taxation and overturned the cities-and-towns
tax.6w With the advent of new types of state privilege taxes in the first
half of this century, 6' the definition of double taxation was expanded
beyond its property tax context and given a more generalized form.
Double taxation has come to be defined in terms of four elements.
Three of these elements establish that the same governmental burden is
being supported by both taxes. These elements require that both taxes
be imposed by the same unit of state government, for the same purpose,
and that both taxes be levied over the same time period. The fourth
element of the definition tests for the unequal distribution of this bur-
den: both taxes must have objects that partially overlap. 62 Unless both
55. See, e.g., C.F. Smith Co. v. Fitzgerald, 270 Mich. 659, 259 N.W. 352, appeal dismissed,
296 U.S. 659 (1935). See also COOLEY, supra note 4, § 225 ("[T]here can be no double taxation,
strictly speaking, under any constitution requiring equality and uniformity in taxation."); Wicker-
sham, Double Taxation, 12 VA. L. REv. 185, 191 (1926).
56. See HELLERSTEIN, supra note 20, at 1-6.
57. Eg., Chicago v. Collins, 175 I11. 445, 51 N.E. 907 (1898) (a tax on all tangible personal
property and a second property tax on automobiles results in double taxation). See COOLEY,
=mpra note 4, § 223.
58. 174 Ky. 712, 193 S.W. 1 (1917).
59. Id at 720-21, 193 S.W. at 6-7.
60. Id
61. See HELLERSTEIN, supra note 20, at 6-9.
62. E.g., People ex rel. Hanrahan v. Caliendo, 50 Ill. 2d 72, 277 N.E.2d 319 (1971), appeal
NOTES AND COMMENTS
taxes exhibit all four elements, no double taxation results.
Both Taxes Imposed By Same Unit Of State Government
The requirement that both taxes be imposed by the same unit of
state government concerns the governmental entity under whose au-
thority and jurisdiction the two taxes are levied. The entity may be the
state itself, a county, a municipality, a school district or any other unit
of state government that exercises taxing authority. If the two taxes are
imposed by different units of state government, no double taxation re-
sults.6 3 In People ex re. Hanrahan v. Caliendo ,6 the Illinois Supreme
Court observed that the City of Chicago and the Chicago Urban Trans-
portation District were distinct governmental entities and thus held that
the real property taxes imposed by each entity did not result in double
taxation.
Both Taxes Imposed For Same Purpose
The requirement that both taxes be imposed for the same purpose
involves the application or use of the revenue from the two taxes.65 A
tax may have a specific purpose, such as funding particular public
works or providing particular public services, or it may have a general
revenue-raising purpose. Where the two taxes have different purposes,
no double taxation results.6 6 In People ex rel Hanrahan v. Caliendo ,67
the Illinois Supreme Court also noted that funding public transporta-
tion and raising general revenues for a municipality were different pur-
poses so that the two taxes having these purposes did not result in
double taxation.
Both Taxes Imposed Over Same Time Period
Both taxes must also be imposed over the same time period. For
dismissed, 406 U.S. 965 (1972); Milwaukee Motor Transp. Co. v. Commissioner, 292 Minn. 66,
193 N.W.2d 605 (1971). See also COOLEY, supra note 4, § 223.
63. Kucharski v. White, 42 IIl. 2d 335, 247 N.E.2d 428 (1969) (no double taxation where two
taxes are imposed by different taxing bodies). Accord, People v. Francis, 40 IIl. 2d 204, 239
N.E.2d 129 (1968). See also Jamison v. City of Charlotte, 239 N.C. 682, 80 S.E.2d 904 (1954) (no
double taxation where two taxes are imposed by a city and a county).
64. 50 Il. 2d 72, 277 N.E.2d 319 (1971), appeal dismissed, 406 U.S. 965 (1972).
65. It is well established that taxes may be levied only for public purposes. E.g., Jones v. City
of Portland, 245 U.S. 217 (1917). See also COOLEY, supra note 4, § 235.
66. Eg., Bardon v. Nudelman, 369 III. 214, 15 N.E.2d 836 (1938) (a tax for general revenue-
raising and a tax for funding regulatory activity do not result in double taxation); Klemm v.
Davenport, 100 Fla. 627, 129 So. 904 (1930) (a tax for general revenue-raising and a tax for fund-
ing street improvements do not result in double taxation). See also People ex rel. Witte v. Frank-
lin, 352 Ill. 528, 186 N.E. 137 (1933).
67. 50 Il. 2d 72, 277 N.E.2d 319 (1971), appeal dismissed, 406 U.S. 965 (1972).
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the large majority of taxes this period consists of a twelve-month period
termed the taxable year.68 Where the two taxes are imposed over non-
overlapping time periods, no double taxation results. 69 In People ex rel
Carey v. Board of Education,70 the Illinois Supreme Court found that
two taxes, respectively imposed from January through August and
from September through December had non-overlapping time periods
and therefore did not result in double taxation.
Objects of the Two Taxes Partially Overlap
The requirement that the objects of the two taxes partially overlap
concerns the persons, property or privileges that are the objects of the
two taxes.7' Partial overlap occurs when some of the objects of one tax
are also the objects of a second tax. This may only occur if both taxes
are imposed on the same type of object, be it the same type of property
or the same privilege. If the two taxes are imposed on different types of
objects, such as different types of property 72 or different privileges, 73 no
partial overlap can occur and no double taxation will result. Similarly,
if one of the two taxes is imposed on property and the other on a privi-
lege, no double taxation will result.
74
The partial overlap required for double taxation is most evident
when some of the property that is subject to one property tax is also
subject to another property tax.75 In City of Chicago v. Collins,76 for
example, automobiles were among the personal property that was sub-
68. E.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 15-1501(24) (1979) (income tax); id § 508a (real property
tax). See generally STATE TAX HANDBOOK (CCH Oct. 1, 1980). The twelve-month period may
coincide with the calendar year but not in all cases.
69. State ex rel. Spink v. Kemp, 365 Mo. 368, 283 S.W.2d 502 (1955) (two taxes imposed over
different calendar years do not result in double taxation). See also E & L Transp. Co. v. Ellington,
212 Tenn. 671, 371 S.W.2d 456 (1963).
70. 55 Ill. 2d 533, 304 N.E.2d 273 (1973).
71. For a discussion of the various objects of taxes, see text accompanying notes 20-46 supra.
72. See, e.g., Harvey Coal & Coke Co. v. Dillon, 59 W. Va. 605, 53 S.E. 928 (1905) (two
taxes, each imposed on different estates in land do not result in double taxation). See also Coo-
LEY, supra note 4, §§ 239, 240.
73. See, e.g., People v. Deep Rock Oil Corp., 343 I11. 388, 175 N.E. 572 (1931) (a tax on the
privilege of operating an automobile and a tax on the privilege of using state highways do not
result in double taxation); C.F. Smith Co. v. Fitzgerald, 270 Mich. 659, 259 N.W. 352, appeal
dismissed, 296 U.S. 659 (1935) (a tax on the privilege of operating chain stores and a tax on the
privilege of carrying on a retail business do not result in double taxation). See also COOLEY, supra
note 4, §§ 233, 1684.
74. See, e.g., Ohio Tax Cases, 232 U.S. 576 (1914) (a property tax and a tax on the privilege
of conducting a railroad business do not result in double taxation); Bode v. Barrett, 412 Ill. 204,
106 N.E.2d 521 (1952) (a property tax on automobiles and a tax on the privilege of using state
highways do not result in double taxation). See also COOLEY, supra note 4, §§ 228, 232.
75. E.g., Campbell County v. Newport, 174 Ky. 712, 193 S.W. 1 (1917). See text accompany-
ing notes 56-58 supra.
76. 175 Ill. 445, 51 N.E. 907 (1898).
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ject to a personal property tax. A second property tax imposed only on
automobiles produced a partial overlap as to automobiles between the
personal property that was the object of the two taxes. The Illinois
Supreme Court held that the second tax resulted in double taxation.
Where the two taxes are imposed on the same privilege, partial
overlap is tested in terms of the legal entities whose privilege is being
taxed. If the privilege of a given group of entities is subject to one tax,
and the same privilege of some of those entities is subject to a second
tax, a partial overlap exists.77 In New York R.R. v. Stevenson ,78 a tax
had been imposed on all corporations on the privilege of issuing stock.
When another tax was then imposed on the same privilege of incorpo-
rated public utilities, such utilities became subject to two taxes while
the same privilege of other corporations was subject to only one tax.
79
The Illinois Supreme Court found that the second tax on the privilege
of incorporated public utilities to issue stock resulted in double taxa-
tion. Of course, where the entities whose privilege is taxed are distinct
and do not overlap, no double taxation will result.80
Interestingly, if the objects of the two taxes overlap exactly so that
both taxes are imposed on the same property or privilege, no prohibited
double taxation exists. Courts regard the second tax as merely an in-
crease of the first tax.8' This treatment is consistent with the fact that
no unequal distribution of the tax burden exists in this type of situa-
tion.
The determination of whether two taxes result in double taxation
may thus be seen as a two-step process. The first step is to establish the
objects of each of the two taxes at issue.8 2 The second step is to deter-
mine whether all of the four elements of double taxation are present. If
both taxes are imposed by the same unit of state government for the
same purpose and over the same time period, and if the objects of both
77. See, e.g., Franklin County Coal Co. v. Ames, 359 I11. 178, 194 N.E. 268 (1934) (a tax on
the privilege of carrying on a retail business, imposed on different retailers selling the same prod-
uct, is not double taxation). See also COOLEY, supra note 4, §§ 233, 1684.
78. 277 I11. 474, 115 N.E. 633 (1917).
79. Id at 481, 115 N.E. 635 ("Both ... [taxes] are exacted for the privilege of exercising a
corporate franchise. ... ).
80. See Milwaukee Motor Transp. Co. v. Commissioner, 292 Minn. 66, 193 N.W.2d 605
(1971) (a parent corporation and its subsidiary are different entities so that taxing each corpora-
tion's privilege of earning income does not result in double taxation). See also Union Central Life
Ins. Co. v. Lowe, 349 Il1. 464, 182 N.E. 611 (1932).
81. See, e.g., Independent School Dist. of Cedar Rapids v. Iowa Employment Security
Comm'n, 237 Iowa 1301, 25 N.W.2d 491 (1946); Van Dyke v. Wisconsin Tax Comm'n, 217 Wis.
528, 259 N.W. 700 (1935). See also COOLEY, supra note 4, § 233.
82. See, e.g., Educational Films Corp. v. Ward, 282 U.S. 379 (1921).
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taxes partially overlap, double taxation results. 8 3
This two-step process was followed by the Illinois Supreme Court
in New York .R. v. Stevenson 84 There, the court first determined that
the two taxes at issue were both imposed on a corporation's privilege of
issuing stock.8 5 The court then proceeded to establish that both taxes
were imposed by the state itself for general state purposes and that both
taxes accrued over the same time period-upon the issuance of stock.
86
Noting that one tax was imposed on the stock-issuing privilege of all
corporations and that the other tax was imposed on the same privilege
of incorporated public utilities, the court concluded that this partial
overlap-with regard to incorporated public utilities-resulted in
double taxation.8
7
Given a finding of double taxation, courts will generally construe
one of the two taxes involved in such a manner as to eliminate the
partial overlap between the objects of both taxes.88 Such action is con-
sistent with the established rule that if a statute can fairly be given a
constitutional construction, courts should adopt that construction, on
the ground that legislatures are presumed to act within their author-
ity.8 9 In New York R.. v. Stevenson,9 the Illinois Supreme Court con-
strued the tax on the stock-issuing privilege of all corporations as
inapplicable to the privilege of incorporated public utilities. Through
this construction, the court eliminated the partial overlap that existed
between the tax on the privilege of all corporations and the tax on the
privilege of incorporated public utilities and thereby eliminated double
taxation.
The only significant exception allowing double taxation involves
situations where a state legislature clearly intended to impose double
taxation and it is not prohibited by the state's constitution. In most
such states, courts will allow double taxation only where the legislative
intent is unmistakable. 9' This high standard of clarity significantly
83. See note 62 supra.
84. 277 Ill. 474, 115 N.E. 633 (1917).
85. Id at 481, 115 N.E. at 635-36.
86. Id at 481-82, 115 N.E. at 635-36.
87. Id at 483, 115 N.E. at 636.
88. See, e.g., Milwaukee Motor Transp. Co. v. Commissioner, 292 Minn. 66, 193 N.W.2d 605
(1971); Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 346 Mass. 667, 195 N.E.2d 332 (1964). See also
COOLEY, supra note 4, §§ 224-226.
89. See, e.g., St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. v. Arkansas, 235 U.S. 350, 369-70 (1914); C.F.
Smith Co. v. Fitzgerald, 270 Mich. 659, 259 N.W. 352, appeal dismissed, 296 U.S. 659 (1935). See
also COOLEY, supra note 4, §§ 495, 509.
90. 277 111. 474, 115 N.E. 633 (1917).
91. Tennessee v. Whitworth, 117 U.S. 129, 137 (1886). Accord, People v. Schweitzer, 369 Ill.
355, 360, 16 N.E.2d 897, 901 (1938). See also E & L Transp. Co. v. Ellington, 212 Tenn. 671, 675,
NOTES AND COMMENTS
narrows the scope of the exception, making it largely unavailable. 92 In
nine states where double taxation is deemed absolutely prohibited, no
exception to the general treatment of remedial construction is recog-
nized.
93
PARTNERSHIPS AND DOUBLE TAXATION: THE ENTITY
AND AGGREGATE VIEWS
Partnership law is characterized by a tension between the entity
and aggregate views of a partnership. 94 Under the entity view, a part-
nership is recognized as a separate legal entity to which rights and du-
ties accrue.95 Under the aggregate view, a partnership is deemed to be
no more than a collection of individuals to whom all the rights and
duties arising from a partnership accrue. 96 Both approaches are well
represented among the various legal contexts in which a partnership is
viewed. 97 The view adopted becomes particularly significant to part-
nership taxation where the approach utilized can affect the determina-
tion of whether double taxation results.
At common law, artificial legal entities could only be created by
the sovereign.98 Thus, early partnership law was based on the aggre-
371 S.W.2d 456, 458 (1963) ("[Double taxation [is] not proscribed.., where it is plain that the
Legislature intended such result.").
92. Research has not revealed any cases in which this exception has been successfully in-
voked.
93. Two states have an express constitutional provision absolutely banning double taxation.
See IDAHO CONST. art. 7, § 5 (1890); ILL. CONST. art IX, § 3(a) (1970). The other seven states
have recognized such a prohibition in their constitutions through judicial interpretation. See
Flynn v. City and County of San Francisco, 18 Cal. 2d 210, 115 P.2d 3 (1941); C.F. Smith Co. v.
Fitzgerald, 270 Mich. 659, 259 N.W. 352, appeal dismissed, 296 U.S. 659 (1935); Panola County v.
C.M. Carrier & Sons, 92 Miss. 148, 45 So. 426 (1908); Opinion of the Justices, 106 N.H. 202, 208
A.2d 458 (1965); State ex rel Attorney Gen. v. Tittmann, 42 N.M. 76, 75 P.2d 701 (1938); Olson v.
Oklahoma Tax Comrn'n, 198 Okla. 607, 180 P.2d 622 (1947); Marshall v. South Carolina Tax
Comm'n, 178 S.C. 57, 182 S.E. 96, cert. denied, 296 U.S. 585 (1935). See also COOLEY, supra note
4, § 225.
94. See general,y S. ROWLEY, ON PARTNERSHIP § 1.3 (2d ed. 1960) [hereinafter referred to as
ROWLEY]; J. CRANE, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF PARTNERSHIP 9-21 (2d ed. 1952) [hereinafter
referred to as CRANE].
95. See, e.g., Lansing v. Bever Land Co., 158 Iowa 693, 138 N.W. 833 (1912); Drucker v.
Wellhouse, 82 Ga. 129, 8 S.E. 40 (1888). See also Drake, Partnership Entity and Tenancy in Part-
nership: The Strugglefor a Defmition, 15 MICH. L. REV. 609 (1917); Crane, The Uniform Partner-
ship Act-A Criticism, 28 HARV. L. REV. 762 (1915).
96. See, e.g., Abbott v. Anderson, 265 Ill. 285, 106 N.E. 782 (1914); Adams v. Church, 42 Or.
270, 70 P. 1037 (1902). See also Lewis, The Uniform Partnership Act-A Reply to Mr. Crane's
Criticism, 29 HARV. L. REV. 158, 291 (1916).
97. See Uniform Partnership Act (codified in Illinois at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1061 , §§ 1-43
(1979)). The Uniform Partnership Act has been adopted by all fifty states. See 6 UNIFORM LAWS
ANNOTATED, Unform Partnershp Act (1969). See also Jensen, Is a Partnership Under the Uniform
Partnership Act an Aggregate or an Entity?, 16 VAND. L. REV. 377 (1963); Crane, The Uniform
Parnershi Act and Legal Persons, 29 HARV. L. REV. 838 (1916).
98. See I C. BATES, THE LAW OF PARTNERSHIP § 171 (1888); CRANE, supra note 94, at 10.
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gate view. 99 The right to manage the partnership business, the right to
share in partnership profits and civil liability for partnership acts were
among the rights and duties that accrued to the individual partners.100
The rapid commercial expansion that characterized the industrial
revolution brought about an increased use of partnerships as a form of
doing business.' 10 The increase in partnership litigation which fol-
lowed unearthed some commercial shortcomings in the aggregate the-
ory that prompted a different approach in the law.
The entity view of a partnership had its origin in the English mer-
cantile law. This law initially developed during the close of the Middle
Ages in special courts and later in courts of equity. Forged by the
needs of its mercantile constituency, the law was based largely on the
commercial customs of the day. Noting that the commercial world ac-
corded de facto entity status to a partnership, courts were increasingly
persuaded to recognize a partnership as a separate entity. 10 2
Property ownership was one of the earlier aspects of a partnership
in which the common law aggregate view was supplanted by the entity
view. Courts had initially attempted to fit partnership ownership of
property within the concepts of joint tenancy or tenancy in common. 
0 3
Thus, title to partnership property was held among the individual part-
ners. This approach had the effect of relegating a partnership creditor
to the status of personal creditor of the individual partners, thereby
depriving his claim of any priority over partnership assets. 104 This ap-
proach also made partnership property available to satisfy a partner's
personal obligations whether or not these obligations were related to
the partnership business and whether or not this would be detrimental
to the partnership and its business creditors. 105 In order to strengthen
the rights of partnership creditors and to insulate the partnership from
99. See, e.g., Puerto Rico v. Russell & Co., 288 U.S. 476 (1933); Faulker v. Hyman, 142 Mass.
53, 6 N.E. 846 (1886). See also I J. BARRETT & E. SEAGO, PARTNERS AND PARTNERSHIPS LAW
AND TAXATION 13 (1956) [hereinafter referred to as BARRETT]; F. MECHEM, ELEMENTS OF THE
LAW OF PARTNERSHIP § 6 (2d ed. 1920).
100. See generally ROWLEY, supra note 94; CRANE, supra note 94.
101. See 1 BARRETT, supra note 99, at 13.
102. See I BARRETT, supra note 99, at 10-13. See also ROWLEY, supra note 94, § 1.1; Burdick,
What is a Law Merchant?, 2 COL. L. REv. 470 (1902). See also F. MECHEM, ELEMENTS OF THE
LAW OF PARTNERSHIP § 7 (2d ed. 1920).
103. See, e.g., Johnson v. Shirley, 152 Ind. 453, 53 N.E. 459 (1899); Woodward v. McAdam,
101 Cal. 438, 35 P. 1016 (1894). See also 2 BARRETT, supra note 99, at 451-52; CRANE, supra note
94, at 11; Drake, Partnership Entity and Tenancy in Partnershio. The Struggle for a Defnition, 15
MICH. L. REV. 609 (1917).
104. See F. BURDICK, LAW OF PARTNERSHIP 252 (3d ed. 1917); 1 C. BATES, THE LAW OF
PARTNERSHIP § 172 (1888).
105. See F. BURDICK, LAW OF PARTNERSHIP 269-71 (3d ed. 1917).
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non-related personal obligations of the individual partners, courts be-
gan to recognize a partnership as a separate entity for purposes of prop-
erty ownership.' 6 This recognition was eventually adopted by the
Uniform Partnership Act.
10 7
In contrast, the treatment of partnership income has always re-
flected the aggregate view. The common law's view is consistent with
the definition of a partnership as an association of individuals engaged
in business for profit. '08 Partners are seen as individually sharing in the
profits and losses of their undertaking, 109 thus rendering the entity view
inappropriate. Perhaps because the distribution of its income is a mat-
ter internal to a partnership, there were no creditors or other outside
parties urging the courts to adopt the entity view. The aggregate view
of partners sharing in the profits and losses of a partnership was also
adopted by the Uniform Partnership Act."10
The treatment accorded to partnerships under state taxes also re-
flects both the entity and aggregate views. I' Generally, the view taken
for purposes of a particular tax will be the same as the view taken for
the underlying substantive aspect of a partnership most closely related
to the object of the tax. Thus, where a tax classifies property according
to the different entities owning it, partnership property is taxed sepa-
rately from the property of the individual partners because a partner-
ship is treated as a separate entity for purposes of owning property." 1
2
Similarly, the aggregate view of partners sharing in the profits and
losses of a partnership has been adopted by the vast majority of state
income tax laws. 1 3 Under these laws, a partnership is treated as sim-
106. See, e.g., Pratt v. McGuinness, 173 Mass. 170, 53 N.E. 380 (1899); Richard v. Allen, 117
Pa. 199, 11 A. 552 (1887). See also 2 BARRETT, supra note 99, at 453.
107. See 6 UNIFORM LAWS ANNOT., Uniform Partnership Act, §§ 8, 25(2)(c).
108. See, e.g., Meehan v. Valentine, 145 U.S. 611 (1892); Berthold v. Goldsmith, 65 U.S. (24
How.) 536 (1860). See also 6 UNIFORM LAWS ANNOT., Uniform Partnership Act, § 6(1). See
generally CRANE, supra note 94, § 4.
109. See ROWLEY, supra note 94, § 6.8; 1 BARRETr, supra note 99, at 28-33.
110. See 6 UNIFORM LAWS ANNOT., Uniform Partnership Act, § 26.
111. Both the entity and aggregate views have been adopted by courts in resolving federal tax
controversies. Compare Burde v. Commissioner, 352 F.2d 995 (2d Cir. 1965) (two partnerships
treated as separate entities for purposes of transferring a patent between them), with Liflans Corp.
v. United States, 390 F.2d 965 (Ct. CI. 1968) (a partnership treated as an aggregate of individuals
for purposes of qualifying for a deduction between related taxpayers). See A. WILLIS, PARTNER-
SHIP TAXATION §§ 2.01-.04 (2d ed. 1976); CRANE, supra note 94, at 20 n.34.
112. See, e.g., Walter G. Hougland & Sons v. McCracken County Bd. of Supervisors, 306 Ky.
234, 206 S.W.2d 951 (1947); Svoboda & Hannah v. Bd. of Equalization, 180 Neb. 215, 142 N.W.2d
328 (1966). See also 6 UNIFORM LAWS ANNOT., Uniform Partnership Act, §§ 8, 25(2)(c); COOLEY,
supra note 4, § 596; 1 C. BATES, THE LAW OF PARTNERSHIP §§ 175, 176 (1888).
113. Thirty-two states and the District of Columbia have an express statutory provision de-
claring a partnership to be a conduit for income tax purposes: ALA. CODE § 40-18-24 (1977);
ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 43-141 (1980); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 84-2012(3) (1980); CAL. REV. & TAX.
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ply a "conduit" through which partnership income flows unimpeded to
the individual partners. No income tax is imposed on the partnership
itself, rather, each partner's share of partnership income is treated as
his own income which is then subject to tax.
As to other privilege taxes, the entity view has generally been fa-
vored.1 4 Perhaps reflecting the same deference to commercial reality
that motivated the English mercantile courts, most other state privilege
taxes treat a partnership as the entity whose particular privilege is
taxed. In Illinois, a partnership is recognized as a separate entity for
purposes of taxes on such privileges as utilizing state highways, engag-
ing in a retail business and operating a hotel. ' 5
The choice between the entity and aggregate views with respect to
how a partnership is treated under the law of a given state can affect the
determination of whether double taxation exists where two taxes on the
same privilege are involved." 6 For two such taxes, partial overlap of
CODE § 17851 (West 1970); COLO. REV. STAT. § 39-22-201 (1973); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 30, § 1143
(1974); D.C. CODE ANN. § 47-1574e (Supp. V 1978); GA. CODE ANN. § 91A-3604 (1980); HAWAII
REV. STAT. § 235-60 (1976); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 79-32,129 (1977); Ky. REV. STAT. § 141.206(2)
(1972); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47:201 (West Supp. 1980); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 5190
(1978); MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 315 (1980); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 62, § 17 (West 1969);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 290.31 (West 1966); Miss. CODE ANN. § 27-7-25 (1972); Mo. ANN. STAT. §
143.401 (Vernon 1976); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 84-4911 (1966); NEB. REV. STAT. § 77-2727
(1976); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54A:2-2 (West Supp. 1980); N.Y. TAX LAW § 364 (McKinney 1975);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-142(c) (1979); N.D. CENT. CODE § 57-38-08 (1971); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 5747.22 (Page 1980); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 2363 (West Supp. 1980); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 316.342 (1979); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 3402-203 (Purdon 1964); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 44-30-1(b)
(1980); S.C. CODE § 12-7-300 (Law. Co-op 1976); UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-14A-36 (1974); VA.
CODE § 58-151.03(b) (Supp. 1980); W. VA. CODE § 11-21-3(b) (1974).
Six states treat a partnership as a conduit for income tax purposes by virtue of the fact that
they base their income tax on the Internal Revenue Code, which provides for such treatment
(I.R.C. § 701): IDAHO CODE § 63-3022 (1976); IOWA CODE ANN. § 422.7 (West 1971); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 206.51 (West Supp. 1980); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 7-2-2 (Supp. 1980); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 32, § 5822 (Supp. 1980); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 71.02(2)(a) (West Supp. 1980).
New Hampshire and Tennessee impose a limited income tax on the income of partnerships-
only income from stocks and bonds is subject to the tax. Additionally, the income taxed as a
partnership's is received by the partners without the imposition of any additional tax. See N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 77:3, :4, :15 (1970); TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-2602 (1976).
Eight states do not impose any income tax: Alaska, Connecticut, Florida, Nevada, South
Dakota, Texas, Washington and Wyoming.
114. See I C. BATES, THE LAW OF PARTNERSHIP § 175 (1888).
115. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 417.11 (1979) (privilege of operating motor vehicles
on state highways); id § 440 (privilege of carrying on a retail business); id § 48 1b.32(8) (privilege
of carrying on a hotel business).
116. Differences between the entity and aggregate views of a partnership do not affect double
taxation where two property taxes are involved. The object of such taxes is property and the
partial overlap required for double taxation must occur with respect to the property taxed, not
with respect to the property owners. See, e.g., Bode v. Barrett, 412 Ill. 204, 106 N.E.2d 521 (1952).
Because a partnership can hold title to property in its own name, see 6 UNIFORM LAWS ANNOT.,
Uniform Partnership Act, §§ 8(3), 25(2)(c), such property would not also be deemed owned by the
individual partners, so even where property is classified by the type of entity owning it for tax
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their objects is tested in terms of the legal entities whose privilege is
subject to the two taxes. If the entities partially overlap, the requisite
partial overlap for a finding of double taxation exists.1 7 Where one tax
is imposed on the privilege of a partnership, the choice between the
entity and aggregate views in construing the second tax will determine
if a partial overlap exists. If the entity view is taken, no partial overlap
can occur between the distinct entities of a partnership and the individ-
ual partners. However, under the aggregate view, partners are also in-
dividuals so that a partial overlap would exist and double taxation
could result.
Although not in a double taxation context, courts have previously
addressed the question of whether a privilege subject to tax is to be
attributed to a partnership or to the individual partners. In Corn v.
Fort,' 8 the Tennessee Supreme Court considered a tax imposed on the
privilege of doing business as a partnership. Although the statute re-
ferred to the privilege taxed as that of a partnership, the court treated
the privilege as that of the individual partners and overturned the
tax. 119 More recently, in Tax Review Board v. Shapiro,'20 the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court considered a municipal income tax that the
municipality sought to apply to a partnership as a separate entity. By
finding that the tax was not applicable to the income of partners resid-
ing outside the municipality, the court effectively treated the income-
earning privilege taxed as that of the individual partners and not that
of the partnership. 12' Unfortunately, the absence of a supporting ra-
tionale in these two cases for the courts' applications of the aggregate
view leaves other courts without guidance as to the factors which
should be considered when deciding whether the entity or the aggre-
gate view should be applied to a particular tax.
purposes, no overlap and, hence, no double taxation would result. See I C. BATES, THE LAW OF
PARTNERSHIP §§ 175, 176 (1888).
117. See text accompanying notes 78-80 supra.
118. 170 Tenn. 377, 95 S.W.2d 620 (1936).
119. Id at 387, 95 S.W.2d at 623-24. Noting that a single individual's privilege of doing busi-
ness was not subject to tax while that of two or more individuals in a partnership was taxed, the
court found such a classification of individuals to be arbitrary and capricious in violation of the
equal protection clause of the Tennessee Constitution and U.S. Constitution. Id See note 2
rupra.
120. 409 Pa. 253, 185 A.2d 529 (1962).
121. Id The court stated: "[W]e must hold that the weight of authority in this Common-
wealth is to the effect that a partnership is treated as an aggregate of individuals and not as a
separate entity." Id at 260, 185 A.2d at 533.
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DOUBLE TAXATION, INCOME TAXES AND PARTNERSHIPS
UNDER ILLINOIS LAW
As in other jurisdictions, the doctrine of double taxation in Illinois
developed as an extended application of its constitution's uniformity
clause to double property taxes.122 As privilege taxes came into vogue,
the doctrine expanded to consider these types of taxes. 123 The doctrine
has enjoyed continued vitality to the present day.'
24
The Illinois legislature first enacted a general income tax in
1932.125 The tax was graduated in nature, whereby the rate at which
income was taxed increased with the amount of income received. 126 In
Bachrach v. Nelson,127 the constitutionality of this income tax was chal-
lenged. After stating that the Illinois Constitution empowered the leg-
islature to enact only property and privilege taxes, the Illinois Supreme
Court concluded that an income tax was really a tax on personal prop-
erty.128 Examining the tax in light of the constitution's uniformity
clause, the court then found that the tax's graduated rate violated the
uniformity requirement. 129 Accordingly, the income tax was over-
turned.
It was not until 1969 that the Illinois legislature again enacted a
general income tax.' 30 Mindful of the Illinois Supreme Court's limited
view of the state's taxing power in Bachrach and perhaps acting on the
suggestion of one commentator,' 31 the legislature imposed the new tax
122. See ILL. CONST. of 1870, art. IX, § 1 (repealed 1971). See also Chicago v. Collins, 175 Ill.
445, 51 N.E. 907 (1898). For a general discussion of the early development of double taxation, see
text accompanying notes 56-60 supra.
123. See, e.g., Union Central Life Ins. Co. v. Lowe, 349 Ill. 464, 182 N.E. 611(1932); People v.
Deep Rock Oil Corp., 343 I11. 388, 175 N.E. 572 (1931).
124. See, e.g., People ex rel Carey v. Board of Educ., 55 Ill. 2d 533, 304 N.E.2d 273 (1973);
People ex rel Hanrahan v. Caliendo, 50 111. 2d 72, 277 N.E.2d 319 (1971), appeal dismissed, 406
U.S. 965 (1972).
125. Income Tax Law, Fifty-Seventh Illinois General Assembly, ist. Sp. Sess., 1931-32 Il.
Laws 91 (1932).
126. Id
127. 349 Il. 579, 182 N.E. 909 (1932).
128. Id at 591-92, 182 N.E. at 914. The court stated:
[M]oney or any other thing of value acquired as gain or profit ... is property, and...
in the aggregate, these acquisitions constitute income, and, in accordance with the axiom
that the whole includes all of its parts, income includes property and nothing but prop-
erty and therefore is itself property.
Id at 592, 182 N.E. at 914. For a discussion of the split among state courts that developed con-
cerning whether the object of an income tax is property or a privilege, see note 37 supra.
129. 349 Ill. at 595-96, 182 N.E. at 915.
130. Illinois Income Tax Act, P.A. 76-261, 1969 Ill. Laws 409 (1969) (codified at ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 120, §§ 1-101 to 17-1701 (1979)).
131. See Cohn, Constitutional Limitations on Income Taxation in Illinois, 1961 U. ILL. L.F.
586, 606-11.
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on the privilege of earning income132 and measured the tax with a sin-
gle, non-graduated rate. 33 In Thorpe v. Mahin,134 the Illinois Supreme
Court upheld the tax by overruling Bachrach and adopting the legisla-
ture's view that the tax was imposed on the income-earning privilege
and not on property. 35 The court also adopted a more expansive inter-
pretation of the state's taxing power.
The newly enacted tax followed the majority of states in treating a
partnership as a conduit. 36 No income tax was levied on the income of
the partnership per se.' 37 Instead, the tax was imposed on partnership
income accruing to partners in their individual capacity. 38 As individ-
uals, the net income of the partners was made subject to a 2.5% tax.139
On December 15, 1970, Illinois adopted a new constitution. 140
Two provisions of the new constitution concerned double taxation.
Section 3(a) of article IX prohibited double taxation of an individual's
income.' 4' Section 5(c) of article IX, however, called for an end to the
personal property tax and directed the Illinois legislature to replace lost
revenue by imposing other types of taxes. 142 Section 5(c) further pro-
132. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 2-201(a) (1979) ("A tax . . . is hereby imposed . . . on the
privilege of earning income in or as a resident of this State.").
133. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 2-201(b) (1979).
134. 43 Ill. 2d 36, 250 N.E.2d 633 (1969).
135. Id at 39-40, 250 N.E.2d at 635. The Illinois Supreme Court quoted approvingly from
New York ex rel. Cohn v. Graves, 300 U.S. 308 (1937), as follows:
The incidence of a tax on income differs from that of a tax on property. Neither tax is
dependent upon the possession by the taxpayer of the subjects of the other. His income
may be taxed although he owns no property, and his property may be taxed although it
produces no income. The two taxes are measured by different standards, the one by the
amount of income received over a period of time, the other by the value of the property
at a particular date. Income is taxed but once; the same property may be taxed recur-
rently.
Id at 314.
136. See text accompanying note 113 supra.
137. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 2-205(b) (1977) (amended 1979) provided in part:
A partnership as such shall not be subject to the tax imposed by this Act. . . . Persons
carrying on business as partners shall be liable for the tax imposed by this Act only in
their separate or individual capacities.
138. Id
139. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 2-201(b)(l) (1979).
140. See ILL. REV. STAT., Const. of the State of Ill., at 15 (1979).
141. ILL. CONST. art. IX, § 3(a) provides:
A tax on or measured by income shall be at a non-graduated rate. At any one time there
may be no more than one such tax imposed by the State for State purposes on individu-
als and one such tax imposed on corporations. In any such tax imposed on corporations
the rate shall not exceed the rate imposed on individuals by more than a ratio of 8 to 5.
142. ILL. CONST. art. IX, § 5(c) provides:
On or before January 1, 1979, the General Assembly by law shall abolish all ad valorem
personal property taxes and concurrently therewith and thereafter shall replace all reve-
nue lost by units of local government and school districts as a result of the abolition of ad
valorem personal property taxes subsequent to January 2, 1971. Such revenue shall be
replaced by imposing statewide taxes, other than ad valorem taxes on real estate, solely
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vided that if an additional income tax on individuals was levied to re-
place the lost revenue, that income tax would not be subject to the ban
against double taxation of an individual's income which appears in sec-
tion 3(a).
143
From 1970 through 1978, the Illinois legislature failed to comply
with the mandate of section 5(c) that the property tax be abolished and
other taxes be enacted to replace it on or before January 1, 1979.'" In
Client Follow-Up Co. v. Hynes, 145 the Illinois Supreme Court held that
the effect of this mandate was to invalidate the personal property tax
after 1978. In the summer of 1979, the Illinois legislature abolished the
personal property tax and enacted four taxes to replace the lost reve-
nue. 146 One of the four taxes was the partnership income tax.
The partnership income tax consists of a 1.5% levy on partnership
net income. 147 Because the conduit provision of the state's general in-
come tax was left untouched by the legislature when it enacted the
partnership tax, 148 partnership income continues to flow to the individ-
on those classes relieved of the burden of paying ad valorem personal property taxes
because of the abolition of such taxes subsequent to January 2, 1971. If any taxes im-
posed for such replacement purposes are taxed on or measured by income, such replace-
ment taxes shall not be considered for purposes of the limitations of one tax and the ratio
of 8 to 5 set forth in Section 3(a) of this Article.
Illinois' personal property tax, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, §§ 499, 502, 508a (1977) (repealed
1979), was abolished due to its high administrative burden and to the inequity arising from the
fact that the tax is not well related to a taxpayer's ability to pay. See Note, Taxation. Assessment
and Collection of Personal Property Taxes, 28 OKLA. L. REV. 933 (1975).
143. ILL. CONST. art. IX, § 5(c) (1970).
144. Id The text of section 5(c) appears in note 142 supra.
145. 75 Ill. 2d 208, 390 N.E.2d 847 (1979).
146. Personal Property Tax Replacement Income Tax Act, P.A. 81-1st Sp. Sess.-l, 1979 Ill.
Laws 4925 (1979). The taxes were: an additional 2.85% corporate income tax; a 1.5% income tax
on the income of partnerships and subchapter S corporations; an additional 1.5% income tax on
trusts; and a 0.8% levy on the invested capital of public utilities. Id
147. The partnership income tax is imposed on what is termed state partnership net income.
This income figure is defined as partnership income per I.R.C. § 703, modified by certain adjust-
ments. These include adding the federal deductions for interest and dividends received, for capi-
tal gains, for state income tax paid and for any guaranteed payments (salary) to partners. The
adjustments also include subtracting from capital gains the valuation limitation amount (Illinois'
basis for property acquired before the imposition of the state income tax in 1969); income tax
refunds; amounts exempt from the state income tax; personal service income per I.R.C. §
1348(b)(1) or reasonable compensation to partners for personal service to the partnership; and
amounts distributed to a partner which is itself an entity subject to one of the taxes enacted to
replace the revenue lost from the abolished personal property tax. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120,
2-202, 2-203(d) (1979).
148. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 2-205(b) (1979) now provides:
A partnership as such shall not be subject to the. .. [general income tax] but shall be
subject to the. . . [partnership income tax]. . . . The partners in a partnership shall be
liable for the . . . [partnership income tax] to the extent such tax is not paid by the
partnership Persons carrying on business as partners shall be liable for the...
[general income tax] only in their separate or individual capacities.
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ual partners where it is subject to a 2.5% general income tax as well. 149
Although the statute declares that the tax is imposed on a partner-
ship's privilege of earning income, 50 the interpretation of whose privi-
lege is being taxed was not altogether clear to one of the delegates at
the constitutional convention which drafted section 5(c). Noting that
section 5(c) authorizes an additional income tax to replace lost revenue
from the abolished personal property tax, Delegate McCracken dis-
cussed whose income would be the object of such a tax:
I am thinking about individuals, . . . perhaps in their capacities as
partners. I am not sure whether I am talking about them or not,
because I am not sure of the Supreme Court's interpretation of the
term 'individual'; . . . I may be talking about partnerships.'15
This potential ambiguity was not considered by the Illinois legislature
when it enacted the partnership income tax,' 52 and this ambiguity be-
came the central issue in Continental Illinois National Bank & Trust Co.
v. Zagel.
CONTINENTAL ILLINOIS NATIONAL BANK & TRUST CO. v. ZAGEL
In Zagel,153 the partnership seeking to overturn the partnership
income tax characterized the tax as falling on the income of the indi-
vidual partners and not on the income of a partnership. 54 Because
each partner's income is also taxed by the state's general income tax,
the plaintiff argued that the new tax resulted in double taxation, thus
violating the section 3(a) ban on double taxation of an individual's in-
come.t 55
149. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 2-201(b)(1) (1979).
150. Id § 2-201(c) (1979) ("[Tlhere is also hereby imposed the Personal Property Tax Re-
placement Income Tax. . . on every. . . partnership. . . . Such taxes are imposed on the privi-
lege of earning or receiving income in or as a resident of this State.").
151. 5 PROCEEDINGS, SIXTH ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 3889 (1972).
152. See Illinois General Assembly House of Representatives, Transcript of Proceedings (Au-
gust 6, 1979).
153. 78 Ill. 2d 387, 401 N.E.2d 491 (1979).
154. Id at 407, 401 N.E.2d at 501.
155. Id The partnership income tax was also challenged on two other constitutional grounds.
One ground was that section 3(a) authorized the imposition of income taxes on individuals and
corporations but not on partnerships. Looking to the constitutional debates pertinent to section
3(a), the court found that such a narrow reading of the section had not been intended. Id at
405-07, 401 N.E.2d at 500-01. The other ground was that the tax violated the equal protection
clause of Illinois' constitution by treating individuals differently depending on whether or not they
were partners. As to this ground, the court found that a showing that this difference in treatment
was arbitrary and capricious had not been made. Id at 407-08, 401 N.E.2d at 501.
The validity of the other taxes that were also enacted to replace the revenue lost by the abol-
ishment of the personal property tax was also challenged, although the issues raised by this other
challenge are not addressed in this comment. Their validity was upheld. For descriptions of these
other taxes, see note 146 supra.
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In its brief discussion of the issue, the Illinois Supreme Court 156
stated:
Petitioners' claim that the act subjects the income of an individual
partner to two taxes in violation of section 3(a) of Article IX is dis-
posed of by the opinion of this court in Lake Shore Auto Parts Co. v.
Korzen,. . . where it was held that the personal property of a part-
nership is distinct from and, thus, taxable apart from the personal
property of the individual partners. (See also Hanley v.
Kusper .... )157
In both Lake Shore Auto Parts v. Korzen15 8 and Hanley v. Kusper,15 9
the court had considered the scope of the term "individuals" as used in
a provision of the old constitution which exempted individuals from
the state's personal property tax. ' 60 Although partnership property had
not been directly at issue in these two cases, the court had noted that
partnership personal property remained subject to the personal prop-
erty tax.
16 '
Justice Clark, in his dissent, 62 argued that the distinction in Lake
Shore Auto Parts between partnership personal property and that of
the individual partners was not applicable to partnership income. He
reasoned that no such distinction could be made for partnership in-
come because the conduit provisions of the general income tax made
partnership income and the partners' income the same. 163 Justice
Clark then proceeded to show that the four elements of double taxation
were present. He noted that both taxes were imposed by the state, for a
general revenue-raising purpose, and that both taxes were levied over
the same tax year.164 He also noted that the objects of the two taxes
partially overlapped in that the income of partners was subject to both
the partnership income tax and the general income tax. He urged the
elimination of double taxation by construing the general income tax as
156. Upon a motion by one of the parties for leave to file an original action, the Illinois
Supreme Court, under its power to hear actions challenging the validity of state revenue measures,
directly heard the case. 78 I11. 2d at 393-94, 401 N.E.2d at 494. See ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 4(a);
ILL. SUP. CT. R. 381.
157. 78 Ill. 2d at 407, 401 N.E.2d at 501 (citations omitted).
158. 54 I11. 2d 537, 296 N.E.2d 342, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1039 (1973).
159. 61 11. 2d 452, 337 N.E.2d 1 (1975).
160. Article IX-A was added to the ILL. CONST. of 1870 in November of 1970 by referendum.
It provided:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this Constitution, the taxation of personal prop-
erty by valuation is prohibited as to individuals.
Id This provision was repealed in 1971.
161. 61 Ill. 2d at 461, 337 N.E.2d at 6; 54 I11. 2d at 239, 296 N.E.2d at 343.
162. 78 Ill. 2d at 415-18, 401 N.E.2d at 505-06 (Clark, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
163. Id at 416, 401 N.E.2d at 505.
164. Id at 416-17, 401 N.E.2d at 505.
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inapplicable to the income that individuals obtain from partnerships. 165
ANALYSIS
The Illinois Supreme Court concluded that the partnership income
tax did not result in double taxation of the individual partners' income
because partnership personal property is taxed separately from that of
the individual partners. 66 Assuming that this terse explanation was
directed at establishing that no partial overlap between the objects of
the two taxes existed, there are two possible underlying rationales that
would preclude double taxation. If the partnership income tax was
deemed to be a property tax under Bachrach v. Nelson, 167 its object
would not overlap with the general income tax's object which is the
income-earning privilege. 68 Alternatively, if the object of the partner-
ship income tax is deemed to be the same income-earning privilege that
is taxed by the general income tax, 169 the treatment of a partnership as
a separate entity, analogous to the manner in which the property tax
had been construed, would also preclude a partial overlap. 70 How-
ever, neither of these underlying rationales would have been tenable
had the majority properly undertaken the same type of comprehensive
double taxation analysis which the dissent utilized.
The correct approach to double taxation issues is the two-step
analysis which first determines the objects of the two taxes and then
determines whether the four elements of double taxation are present.
Such a treatment begins in this situation with a determination of the
respective objects of the partnership income tax and the general income
tax. 17 As to the partnership income tax, the statute declares that the
tax is imposed on the privilege of earning income. 172 The tax is mea-
sured as a specified percentage of net income earned over a twelve-
month period, 73 as are most income taxes. In its operation and effect,
the tax accrues only upon the earning of income, unaffected by other
165. Id at 418, 401 N.E.2d at 506.
166. See text accompanying note 112 supra.
167. 349 IU. 579, 182 N.E. 909 (1932). For an excerpt of the court's rationale, see note 128
supra.
168. Where the object of one tax is property and the object of a second tax is a privilege, no
partial overlap can occur. See note 74 supra.
169. This is consistent with the statutory language of the partnership income tax. See note 150
supra-.
170. See text accompanying notes 77-80 supra.
171. See text accompanying notes 19-22 supra.
172. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 2-201(c) (1979).
173. Id. §§ 2-201(c), 2-201(d) (1979).
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circumstances or activities of a partnership. 74 Although the tax was
imposed to replace lost revenue from the abolished personal property
tax, it cannot be considered a property tax measured by the related
income because the tax accrues regardless of whether a partnership has
personal property or not.' 75 Moreover, such an interpretation of the
tax's object would render the tax unconstitutional. 76 Thus, the object
of the partnership income tax is clearly the privilege of earning income
and any interpretation of the court's terse explanation that would treat
the partnership income tax as a tax on personal property lacks a plausi-
ble basis in law.
The state's general income tax is also statutorily imposed on the
privilege of earning income. 177 In Thorpe v. Mahin,178 the Illinois
Supreme Court approved this characterization of the tax's object.
Thus, the object of both taxes is the privilege of earning income. The
majority's discussion fails to comment on the nature of the partnership
income tax's object and, at best, confuses this issue by relying on two
personal property tax cases.
179
Once it is shown that the objects of the two taxes are the same, the
second step of the analysis is to determine whether the four elements of
double taxation are present. Whether the partnership income tax and
the general income tax exhibit the four elements of double taxation,
however, is not as straightforward as was portrayed by the dissent. It is
uncontroverted that both taxes are imposed by the same unit of state
government-the state itself-and that they are imposed over the same
time period-the taxable year.180 However, it is less certain whether
both taxes are levied for the same purpose and whether the objects of
both taxes partially overlap.
The purpose of the state's general income tax is to raise un-
restricted funds. Its purpose is implied by the Illinois legislature's di-
rection that all revenue collected under the tax is to be paid into the
174. See New York ex rel Cohn v. Graves, 300 U.S. 308 (1937).
175. Cases construing a tax as imposed on property and measured by the derived income
assume or require the presence of the property that is subject to tax. See, e.g., Great Northern Ry.
Co. v. Minnesota, 278 U.S. 503 (1929); Redfield v. Fisher, 135 Or. 180, 292 P. 813 (1930), cert.
denied, 284 U.S. 617 (1931).
176. In Client Follow-Up Co. v. Hynes, 75 I11. 2d 208, 390 N.E.2d 847 (1979), the Illinois
Supreme Court held that a personal property tax would be unconstitutional as of January I, 1979.
Id at 230, 390 N.E.2d at 857. See text accompanying note 145 supra.
177. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 2-201(a) (1979).
178. 43 Ill. 2d 36, 250 N.E.2d 633 (1969).
179. 78 Ill. 2d at 404, 401 N.E.2d at 499.
180. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, §§ 2-201(a), 2-201(c) (1979).
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general reserve fund of the state treasury. 18 1 In contrast, as stated by
section 5(c),182 the purpose of the partnership income tax is to replace
the revenue lost by units of local government and school districts as a
result of the abolition of the state's personal property tax. To this end,
revenue collected under the tax is deposited in a special fund of the
state treasury for distribution in accordance with that purpose.1
83
It is arguable whether this difference between the two taxes is suffi-
cient to conclude that the two taxes have different purposes. The dis-
sent felt that both taxes had the same general purpose of raising
operating revenue for the state and its political subdivisions. 184 This
view is also supported by the fact that the application of the partner-
ship tax funds remains largely discretionary and is not directed toward
specific governmental functions or acts. On the other hand, the fact
that some restrictions existed on the entities that were to apply the fund
in the case of the partnership income tax imports a narrower and ar-
guably different purpose from that of the general income tax. Al-
though imputing to both taxes the same general revenue-raising
purpose appears to be the better reasoned view, 185 a careful court could
have relied on this ostensible difference in concluding that no double
taxation existed. By so doing, the court would have avoided the deeper
doctrinal issue that lurked in the question of whether the objects of the
two taxes partially overlap.
Given that the object of both taxes is the privilege of earning in-
come, partial overlap is tested with respect to the legal entities whose
income-earning privilege is taxed. 186 Because the two taxes at issue are
imposed on the privilege of partnerships and of individuals, the ques-
tion of partial overlap turns on how a partnership's income-earning
privilege is viewed. If the privilege is viewed as that of a legal entity
distinct from its individual partners, the groups whose privilege is being
taxed-partners and partnerships--do not overlap. If, however, the
privilege taxed is viewed as that of the individual partners, a partial
overlap between partners and individuals exists. 18 7 Under this latter
181. Illinois Income Tax Act art. IX, § 901(a), 1969 Ill. Laws 436 (1969) (codified at ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 120, § 9-901(a) (1979)).
182. ILL. CONST. art. IX, § 5(c). See note 142 supra for the text of § 5(c).
183. Personal Property Replacement Income Tax Act, P.A. 81-1st Sp. Sess.-I, § 1(e), 1979 Ill.
Laws 4927-28 (1979). See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 85, § 616 (1979).
184. 78 Ill. 2d at 416-17, 401 N.E.2d at 505 (Clark, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
185. For examples of the distinctions that have been made concerning tax purposes, see note
66 supra.
186. See text accompanying notes 77-80 supra.
187. Partners are treated as individuals for purposes of the state's general income tax. See ILL.
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view, the income-earning privilege of individuals who are not partners
is only subject to the general income tax while the privilege of those
individuals who are partners becomes subject to both the partnership
income tax and the general income tax.
The more convincing interpretation of the court's explanation is
that it viewed the privilege being taxed as that of a legal entity distinct
from the individual partners. Although the two property tax cases on
which the court relied 8 8 are indicative of this distinction, they do not
provide a meaningful supporting rationale. A partnership has long
been treated as a separate entity for the purpose of owning property. 8 9
To say that, therefore, a partnership should be treated as a separate
entity with respect to the privilege of earning income constitutes an un-
convincing analogy.
The recognition of a partnership as a distinct entity for purposes of
property ownership developed in response to the inadequacy of apply-
ing traditional modes of property ownership to a partnership. In order
to strengthen the rights of partnership creditors and insure a measure of
financial stability for a partnership, the entity view was adopted. 90
Partnership income, on the other hand, is premised on the sharing of
profits and losses among the partners. This premise is an element in
the definition of a partnership and is also reflected in the conduit provi-
sion of the vast majority of state income tax laws. 191 Given that the
underlying rationale for treating a partnership as a separate entity in a
property tax setting is markedly different from the considerations at-
taching to the application of the aggregate view in the income tax con-
text, the analogy to the property tax rule provides scant support for the
income tax distinction between partnerships and partners which the
court seemed to make.
A more convincing analogy might have been made to the entity
treatment generally given to partnerships under non-income privilege
taxes, 192 but it would have required more incisive and better articulated
reasoning than the court seemed willing to do. Even if such an argu-
ment had been made, the fact remains that the entity treatment of part-
nership income is fundamentally at odds with the income-sharing
REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 1-205(b) (1979). See note 148 supra for the pertinent text of § 1-205(b).
188. Hanley v. Kusper, 61 111. 2d 452, 337 N.E.2d 1 (1975); Lake Shore Auto Parts Co. v.
Korzen, 54 IU. 2d 237, 296 N.E.2d 342, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1039 (1973).
189. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 106 , § 8(3) (1979) (section 8(3) of the Uniform Partnership Act).
190. See text accompanying notes 103-07 supra.
191. See text accompanying notes 108-10 supra.
192. See text accompanying notes 114-15 supra.
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characteristics of a partnership. Accordingly, for purposes of a tax on
partnership income, the aggregate view should prevail.
The Illinois Supreme Court could have based its conclusion that
no double taxation existed by finding either that the two taxes had dif-
ferent purposes or that the objects of the two taxes did not partially
overlap. However, none of the grounds underlying such findings ap-
pear readily supportable. Indeed, the more cogent arguments lead to
contrary findings. Thus, the partnership income tax and the general
income tax fulfill the four elements and double taxation is the result.
Ironically, a finding that the partnership income tax resulted in
double taxation would not have made it unconstitutional under the sec-
tion 3(a) ban against double income taxation of individuals. 193 Section
5(c) specifically exempts from the section 3(a) ban any income taxes
enacted to replace the lost revenue from the abolished personal prop-
erty tax. 194 Since the partnership income tax was one of the taxes en-
acted to replace such lost revenue, 95 it is not subject to the section 3(a)
ban.
Because the court did not view the partnership income tax as im-
posed on the income-earning privilege of the individual partners, it did
not consider the tax as a second tax on the income of individuals.
Hence, there was no occasion to consider the section 5(c) exception.
Had the court properly found that the partnership income tax was im-
posed on the income-earning privilege of the individual partners and
that it therefore resulted in double taxation, the court could have then
nevertheless applied the section 5(c) exception to uphold the tax. The
court would thus have avoided the strained analogy on which it relied.
The dissent's failure to apply the section 5(c) exception was a signifi-
cant oversight on its part as well.
Absent the section 5(c) exception to the section 3(a) double taxa-
tion ban, a finding of double taxation should have led the Zagel court
to construe either the partnership income tax or the general income tax
in such a manner as to avoid double taxation. 196 The dissent's sugges-
tion that the general income tax should be construed so as not to tax the
income that individuals receive as partners from a partnership would
have worked well in this regard. 197 The partnership income tax would
then have been viewed as taxing an individual's privilege of earning
193. ILL. CoNsT. art. IX, § 3(a). See note 141 supra for the text of § 3(a).
194. ILL. CONST. art. IX, § 5(c). See note 142 supra for the text of § 5(c).
195. See text accompanying notes 144-46 supra.
196. See text accompanying notes 88-93 supra.
197. 78 Ill. 2d at 418, 401 N.E.2d at 506 (Clark, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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income through a partnership, while the general income tax would be
viewed as taxing an individual's privilege of earning income from all
other sources, so that no partial overlap of the objects of the two taxes
would occur and, thus, no double taxation would result.
In Zagel, the Illinois Supreme Court sanctioned a substantive de-
parture from the aggregate view of a partnership which is generally
followed in partnership income taxation. The court adopted the entity
view of a partnership in rather brusque fashion, neglecting to provide a
plausible rationale for upholding this change in the law. Without such
a rationale, the decision offers no guidance to other courts that may be
called upon to decide between the entity and aggregate view of a part-
nership both in the income tax context and in other areas of partner-
ship law.1
98
The court's decision also serves to disparage the doctrine of double
taxation. The majority's cursory treatment of the double taxation issue
is inappropriate to the vitality which the doctrine has enjoyed in Illi-
nois as well as in other jurisdictions. 199 In an era in which the need for
state tax revenues is increasing dramatically and in which the scheme
of state taxes is growing in complexity,2°° the doctrine of double taxa-
tion has an important role to play in ensuring an equitable distribution
of the tax burden. 20' Accordingly, it should continue to be applied by
the courts. In failing to apply the doctrine adequately to the situation
before it, the Illinois Supreme Court has permitted an inequitable and
legally indefensible tax burden to fall on those individuals who are
partners.
CONCLUSION
In Zagel, the Illinois Supreme Court faced a double taxation chal-
lenge to a novel partnership income tax. It was alleged that the new
tax, together with the state's general income tax on individuals, resulted
in double taxation of the individual partners' income in violation of
section 3(a) of article IX of the Illinois Constitution. By summarily
finding a partnership to be a legal entity distinct from its partners for
purposes of the new tax, the court avoided a double taxation result.
However, in so doing, the court ignored the rationale that supports the
198. The political attractiveness of a partnership income tax as a source of revenue makes it
likely that other state courts may soon be faced with double taxation challenges to tax statutes
similar to the one at issue in Zagel.
199. See notes 57-93, 122-24 supra.
200. See generally HELLERSTEIN, supra note 20, at 1-26.
201. See notes 47-55 supra.
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widely held aggregate view of a partnership with respect to partnership
income. The court also undermined the doctrine of double taxation by
its cursory treatment of the issue and circumvented the doctrine's pur-
pose by allowing an inequitable tax burden distribution to stand. Iron-
ically, a finding that the partnership income tax results in double
taxation would not have made it unconstitutional under section 3(a) in
any event since the tax was one of those enacted to replace revenues
lost from the abolished personal property tax. As such, it is exempted
from the section 3(a) ban by section 5(c) of article IX of the Illinois
Constitution.
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